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TREATMENT DIFFERENCES AND POLITICAL REALITIES 
IN THE GAAP-IFRS DEBATE 
William W. Bratton* and Lawrence A. Cunningham** 
INTRODUCTION 
NTERNATIONAL Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) 
have swept the globe1 even as Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (“GAAP”) have retained their hold over reporting 
companies and securities markets in the United States. But the 
globalization wave continues to rise and GAAP’s days appear to 
be numbered, along with those of its generator, the Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board (“FASB”). The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”), long the backer and protector of GAAP and 
the FASB, lately changed course to defect against them in favor of 
IFRS and its generator, the International Accounting Standards 
Board (“IASB”). The road to defection began when the SEC 
eliminated the requirement that foreign issuers registered in the 
United States and reporting under IFRS restate their financials to 
GAAP.2 The political economic logic of globalization took over 
from there. In 2007, the SEC proposed to extend the option to re-
port under IFRS to U.S. issuers.3 That option, said the SEC, would 
afford competitive advantages to U.S. issuers with extensive opera-
I 
* Peter P. Weidenbruch, Jr., Professor of Business Law, Georgetown University 
Law Center. 
** Henry St. George Tucker III, Research Professor of Law, The George Washing-
ton University Law School. For excellent research assistance, thanks to Chris Davis 
and Dan Martin. 
1 For an account of this, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, The SEC’s Global Account-
ing Vision: A Realistic Appraisal of a Quixotic Quest, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 1 (2008).  
2 Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared in Ac-
cordance with International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation to 
U.S. GAAP, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8879, 73 Fed. Reg. 986 (2008), reprinted in 
[2002 to Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 88,032 (Dec. 21, 2007). 
3 Concept Release on Allowing U.S. Issuers to Prepare Financial Statements in Ac-
cordance with International Financial Reporting Standard, Exchange Act Release 
Nos. 33-8831, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,600 (proposed Aug. 14, 2007), reprinted in [2002 to Cur-
rent Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,944 (Aug. 7, 2007) [hereinafter 
2007 Concept Release].  
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tions abroad.4 But the commentators pushed back.5 They argued 
that the value of global convergence in accounting standards lies in 
enhanced comparability across the financials of different issuers;6 
accordingly, admitting two competing accounting systems into the 
domestic market would only retard progress toward the goal. The 
SEC responded by admitting the policy salience of comparability 
and doubling its bet on IFRS: it has produced a new “Roadmap” 
that describes a process leading to mandatory use of IFRS by do-
mestic issuers by 2014.7 The Roadmap bypasses an alternative, 
more painstaking route to convergence—a longstanding joint pro-
ject of the FASB and the IASB directed to the articulation of a 
common set of accounting standards.8 
Professor Cox accepts the termination of the requirement of 
GAAP restatements by foreign issuers.9 We agree, for the reasons 
he states. We read him to be concerned about an IFRS option for 
U.S. issuers,10 and so are we. We read him to be very concerned 
about the elimination of GAAP,11 and so are we. We would like to 
4 Id. ¶ 45,601. 
5 One of us has raised the following objections: (1) effective competition presup-
poses full information and IASB has a practice of misrepresenting the contents of 
IFRS; and (2) widespread adoption of IFRS signals a national-level preference for 
comparability over competition. See Cunningham, supra note 1, at 26–27. Numerous 
accounting scholars expressed opposition to the SEC’s ambitions, although for a wide 
variety of reasons. For a collection and summary, see Posting of David Albrecht to 
The Summa–Debits and Credits of Accounting Professor David Albrecht, 
http://profalbrecht.wordpress.com/2008/10/04/publishing-schedule/ (Oct. 4, 2008) (re-
viewing criticisms by Shyam Sunder (Yale Univ.), Ray Ball (Univ. of Chicago), J. 
Edward Ketz (Penn State Univ.), Tom Selling (Thunderbird Sch. of Global Mgmt., 
emeritus), Bob Jensen (Trinity Univ., emeritus), and David Albrecht (Bowling Green 
State Univ.)).  
6 See Cunningham, supra note 1, at 27–28. 
7 Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance 
with International Financial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 33-8982, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,816 (proposed Nov. 21, 2008), reprinted in [2002 to 
Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 88,409 (Nov. 14, 2008) [hereinaf-
ter 2008 Roadmap].  
8 See A Roadmap for Convergence between IFRSs and US GAAP—2006–2008: 
Memorandum of Understanding between the FASB and the IASB, Feb. 27, 2006, 
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/874B63FB-56DB-4B78-B7AF-49BBA18C98D9/ 
0/MoU.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2009). 
9 James D. Cox, Coping in a Global Marketplace: Survival Strategies for a 75-Year-
Old SEC, 95 Va. L. Rev. 941, 985 (2009). 
10 Id. at 985–86. 
11 Id. 
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take this opportunity to follow up his paper with some amplifying 
points along similar lines. 
The SEC’s reports respecting these convergence initiatives talk 
the globalization talk, extolling the benefits of convergence. We 
read that standardization yields cost savings12 and that a single 
global set of reporting standards yields an ultimate gain in compa-
rability.13 Both facilitate the search for global opportunities by U.S. 
investors14 and make U.S. capital markets more attractive to for-
eign issuers.15 But, as so often is the case with globalization talk, 
things get left out. We discuss two of them here.16 
First, this is not just a matter of choosing the framework for stan-
dard setting. The accounting treatments themselves are at issue, 
treatments that for the most part concern domestic reporting firms 
and domestic users of financial statements. This may seem obvious, 
as a change of standard setter means different standards and the 
change would extend to domestic companies. But the Roadmap 
spends only three of its 165 pages comparing IFRS to GAAP.17 We 
take the occasion to fill in some missing details, including a treat-
ment-by-treatment comparison of GAAP and IFRS in the Appen-
dix. We go on to discuss the implications of such differences. 
The familiar debate over the relative merits rules and principles 
captures many of the matters at stake, which takes us to our second 
point of amplification. The rules versus principles comparison only 
has meaning in context, which includes not only the compliance 
environment, but also the political and interest group alignments 
surrounding the standard setter.18 These matters tend to be as-
sumed away in recent globalization discussions. The discussants 
treat standard-setter independence as an accomplished fact on 
both sides of the Atlantic, an assumption that became widespread 
after the IASB was reorganized during the last decade to acquire a 
12 2007 Concept Release, supra note 3, ¶ 45,604.  
13 Id. ¶ 45,606; 2008 Roadmap, supra note 7, ¶ 70,823. 
14 2008 Roadmap, supra note 7, ¶ 70,818. 
15 Id. ¶ 70,824 (asserting that a U.S. dual standard “may create challenges in the U.S. 
capital markets”). 
16 For discussion of additional points, see Cunningham, supra note 1. 
17 2008 Roadmap, supra note 7, ¶ 70,826–27. 
18 See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of 
“Principles-Based Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Account-
ing, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1411 (2007). 
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governance structure that closely resembles the FASB’s structure.19 
Politics do not retreat so easily, however. The FASB maintained its 
independence during its thirty-five-year history in the teeth of op-
position from corporate management. As the independent FASB 
formulated more and more standards, management experienced a 
steady diminution of its zone of financial reporting discretion. A 
switch to IFRS would allow management to reclaim some of the 
lost territory. Thus, the Roadmap sends an implicit political signal. 
The interest group alignment that protected the FASB, comprised 
of auditing firms, actors in the financial markets, and the SEC, has 
disintegrated as U.S. capital market power has waned in the face of 
international competition. Management is the shift’s incidental 
beneficiary, with possible negative effects for domestic markets. 
I. COMPARING TREATMENTS UNDER GAAP AND IFRS 
The Appendix sets out a treatment-by-treatment comparison of 
cases where GAAP and IFRS establish different standards. We se-
lected the treatments for salience based on our own judgment and 
experience.20 If we went treatment by treatment through the list, we 
19 For a discussion of the governance issues and process that led to IASB’s reorgani-
zation, see David S. Ruder et al., Creation of World Wide Accounting Standards: 
Convergence and Independence, 25 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 513, 526–54 (2005). 
 It should be noted that IASB does not yet meet the criteria established under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 108(b)–109, 116 Stat. 745, 768-69 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s, 7219 (2006)) for SEC recognition, because it is not 
funded by Congressionally levied fees. FASB, long supported by private contribu-
tions, came to be funded by fees levied on public companies under § 108 of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act. IASB, in contrast, remains privately funded and implicitly beholden 
to the business and accounting interests that provide the money. For discussion of 
other possible problems under the requirements, see Cunningham, supra note 1, at 
29–33. 
 The Roadmap discusses the funding problem. To circumvent this problem, IASB is 
working with the International Organization of Securities Commissions to form an 
international Monitoring Group made up of representatives of various national regu-
lators. See 2008 Roadmap, supra note 7, ¶ 70,821–22. 
20 More exhaustive lists are available. See, e.g., Barry J. Epstein & Eva K. Jermako-
wicz, Wiley IFRS 2008: Interpretation and Application of International Financial Re-
porting Standards app. C at 26–31 (2008). Large accounting firms also have compiled 
booklets describing treatment differences. See, e.g., Deloitte, IRFSs and US GAAP: 
A Pocket Comparison (2008), available at http://www.deloitte.com/ 
dtt/cda/doc/content/us_assurance_IFRS_US_comparison2008.pdf; Deloitte, IFRSs in 
Your Pocket: An IAS Plus Guide (2008), available at http://www.deloitte.com/ 
dtt/cda/doc/content/pocket2008%284%29.pdf; Ernst & Young, US GAAP v. IFRS 
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would prefer the GAAP treatment in a majority of cases, but also 
would articulate good reasons to support a number of the IFRS 
treatments. Whatever the preferences of particular observers re-
specting particular treatments, a scan of the list reveals a funda-
mental problem with the current “either/or” policy discussion over 
the choice of systems. Only the accountants themselves are capable 
of addressing the matters at stake in an informed way.21 The poli-
cymakers trade in characterizations. 
The SEC’s characterization, set out in the Roadmap, describes 
IFRS as “not as prescriptive” as GAAP and as holding out “a 
greater amount of options” while providing “a relatively lesser 
amount of guidance.”22 The SEC notes that greater optionality (to 
borrow its term) could detract from consistency and comparability 
and make litigation and enforcement outcomes harder to predict.23 
At the same time, it notes that relaxed prescription may make it 
The Basics (2008); PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Similarities and Differences: A Com-
parison of IFRS and US GAAP, available at http://www.pwc.com/gx/eng/about/ 
svcs/corporatereporting/SandD_07.pdf (Oct. 2007).  
21 Accounting experts tend to agree, as an empirical matter, that applying GAAP 
versus IFRS results in significant bottom line reporting differences. See Cox, supra 
note 9, at 948. We note that they also disagree on the normative policy implications of 
the data. Consider literature reviews and policy analysis by two distinguished commit-
tees of the American Accounting Association, the preeminent academic accounting 
body in the United States. Authors of the two studies agree that the empirical evi-
dence indicates that significant differences exist in reported accounting results when 
applying the two standards, including the bottom line balance sheet and  
income statement aggregates. Yet the two draw different conclusions, one  
encouraging competition among multiple standards and the other cautioning that 
moving the United States to IFRS is premature. Compare Karim Jamal et al.,  
Am. Accounting Ass’n Fin. Accounting Standards Comm., A Perspective on  
the SEC’s Proposal to Accept Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance  
with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Without  
Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020408 (finding differences in outcomes but no evidence of 
relative superiority and therefore concluding that competition among the standards is 
optimal policy stance), with Patrick E. Hopkins et al., Am. Accounting Ass’n Fin. Re-
porting Policy Committee, Response to the SEC Release: Acceptance from Foreign 
Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance with International 
Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP (2008), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1083679 (finding material 
differences in outcomes that are relevant to investment decisions and therefore con-
cluding that it is premature for the United States to adopt IFRS). 
22 2008 Roadmap, supra note 7, ¶ 70,826. 
23 Id. 
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easier for issuers to account for transactions in accordance with 
their underlying economics.24 Thus, the SEC at its bottom line 
frames the matters at stake within the rules versus principles dis-
course, taking the occasion to advocate principles.25 But we also 
note a tension in the SEC’s framework: whatever international 
comparability enhancement the Roadmap holds out implies a sac-
rifice of comparability in the domestic context. The SEC’s stated 
goal is inherently elusive.26 
The Appendix contains some classic exemplars where GAAP is 
famous for rules while IFRS is known for principles. Consider first 
accounting for capital leases—long-term leases that must be 
booked on the lessee’s balance sheet (Appendix § VIII). GAAP 
breaks out four defined criteria, including one by-the-numbers test 
keyed to the useful life of the asset under lease, with the criteria 
determining the treatment. IFRS bids the reporting company to 
look to the economics of the transaction, including eight factors to 
assist its determination without stipulating results following from 
their application.27 It bears noting that while IFRS is indeed more 
flexible, the GAAP treatment, founded on a list of factors, does 
not determine results on a stand-alone basis. American lawyers 
would describe both treatments as “standards.” 
Now turn to accounting consolidation (Appendix § X), probably 
the most frequently cited case of GAAP as rules and IFRS as prin-
ciples. Under both GAAP and IFRS, when one firm “controls” 
another, both report on a consolidated basis. GAAP largely de-
fines control with a by-the-numbers test: consolidation follows 
from ownership of fifty percent plus one share of the subsidiary’s 
stock. But, the inference of control can be rebutted where control 
actually is not held or is temporary.28 IFRS begins with a fifty per-
cent plus one share test as well, but modifies the zone of control 
under a standard that variously looks to other arrangements re-
24 Id. 
25 For a more detailed discussion of SEC pronouncements articulated under previ-
ous SEC leadership, see Cunningham, supra note 18, at 1446–53. 
26 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Editorial, Beware the Temptation of Global Stan-
dards, Fin. Times, Sept. 10, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1d612b96-5fc3-11dc-b0fe-
0000779fd2ac.html.  
27 Epstein & Jermakowicz, supra note 20, at 533–35. 
28 Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 
94: Consolidation of Majority Owned Subsidiaries ¶¶ 10, 13 (1987). 
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specting voting shares, contractual arrangements, and regulatory 
contexts. Application of the standard can cut either way, turning 
less than fifty-one percent ownership into control or rejecting a 
finding of control given more than fifty percent.29 The 
rules/principles distinction once again is descriptive of the differ-
ence. But a caution about the description of GAAP once again is in 
order: the fifty-plus-one presumption is rebuttable under both sys-
tems. 
IFRS accords reporting companies more elbow room in both of 
the above cases, but a dispassionate search for economic truth is 
not its only normative motivation. To get a fuller picture of the is-
sues at stake, compare the treatments for tangible long-lived assets 
(Appendix § VII). Under GAAP, they are carried on a cost basis. 
If the asset’s value is impaired, the impairment results in a charge 
to current income. Under IFRS, the asset may be carried at cost or 
fair value. If the asset’s value is impaired, the loss is dealt with by a 
balance sheet adjustment only. Moreover, if the asset’s value re-
covers after the impairment, the balance sheet adjustment can (and 
in some circumstances must) be reversed. Here we see that GAAP 
is motivated by conservatism, the practice of dealing with uncer-
tainty through asymmetric recognition of losses compared to 
gains.30 It also favors verifiable numbers, thereby hewing more 
closely to traditional cost accounting and constraining manage-
ment’s “optionality” respecting balance sheet presentations. IFRS, 
being more comfortable about extending management discretion 
to revalue assets, includes a broader range of fair value treatments, 
introducing subjectivity into the determination of balance sheet 
amounts. Thus, under GAAP, when a tangible asset is written 
down, the write-down is forever, while under IFRS, tangible asset 
values can go up and down with exterior shifts in valuation as man-
agement determines. 
Note also that in the case of a decline in value, GAAP forces 
recognition on the income statement, while IFRS lets the company 
take care of the matter with a balance sheet adjustment. 
29 Epstein & Jermakowicz, supra note 20, at 441–42. 
30 See Sudipta Basu, The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of 
Earnings, 24 J. Acct. & Econ. 3 (1997).  
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This difference also applies more generally. GAAP is income 
statement oriented because it evolved as a system responsive to the 
demands of equity holders in U.S. financial markets.31 When 
GAAP requires an event to make an impact on the income state-
ment, it in effect flags the event for actors valuing the company. 
IFRS, with its ties to block-holder regimes, favors the balance 
sheet, reflecting the greater influence of other constituents, in par-
ticular bank creditors and employees.32 
Now compare the treatments for research and development ex-
penses (Appendix § VIII). Under GAAP, these are expensed in 
the period incurred, and cash outflows are classified into the oper-
ating section of the cash flow statement. Under IFRS, research and 
development costs are capitalized; that is, the company books the 
costs as an asset and shows them on its cash flow statement as in-
vestment cash flows. A basic policy difference again is manifest: 
under GAAP, conservatism is a motivating principle, and doubts 
tend to be resolved by forcing a present deduction on the income 
statement. IFRS is more liberal and management-friendly, assum-
ing that research and development results in tangible economic 
value and delaying recognition of its costs for an extended future. 
We now turn to revenue recognition (Appendix § IV), once 
again to see conservatism in action in GAAP. Given a service con-
tract to be performed over multiple reporting periods, IFRS lets a 
company recognize all the revenue up front upon partial perform-
ance. GAAP, taking the idea that revenues should be matched to 
expenses more seriously, amortizes these contracts over the period 
of service without up-front recognition. (We note that the IFRS 
approach bears a more than passing resemblance to the treatment 
that Enron Corporation received from FASB’s Emerging Issues 
31 For more discussion on the evolution of IFRS, see infra text accompanying notes 
35–38. 
32 See Cunningham, supra note 1, at 48. There is a parallel dark side to this. In the 
United States, accounting manipulation generally affects the income statement, with 
earnings per share being a key factor in the compensation of the corporate insiders 
responsible. In block-holder countries, manipulation tends to affect the balance sheet, 
with payoffs to the insiders responsible stemming from the allocation of corporate as-
sets. Id. (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the U.S. 
and Europe Differ, 21 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol’y 198, 199 (2005); Simon Johnson et al., 
Tunneling, 90 Am. Econ. Rev. 22 (2000)); see also Vladimir Atanasov et al., Unbun-
dling and Measuring Tunneling (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 117, 
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1030529. 
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Task force, under which it was permitted to show all gains from its 
long-term energy contracts up-front.33) A similar comparison ob-
tains respecting accounting for pension obligations. Under GAAP, 
unfunded pension benefit obligations must be shown as liabilities 
on the balance sheet. IFRS requires no balance sheet disclosure. 
Once again, conservatism motivates GAAP, while managers get 
the benefit of the doubt under IFRS. 
Finally, we turn to inventory accounting (Appendix § VI), an 
area where GAAP is the more flexible of the two regimes. For cost 
accounting purposes, one must make an assumption about the or-
der in which goods are sold. They are either treated as sold in the 
direct order of production or acquisition (first-in-first-out or FIFO) 
or as sold in reverse order of production or acquisition (last-in-
first-out or LIFO). Given rising prices, FIFO more closely reflects 
economic reality on the balance sheet, listing inventories close to 
current values, while LIFO better reflects prevailing economics on 
the income statement with a figure for cost of goods sold reflecting 
current prices. GAAP permits companies to choose; IFRS, with its 
regime of balance sheet primacy, requires FIFO. 
The above comparison confirms the SEC’s description—GAAP 
constrains, where IFRS is flexible—but does so with the noted 
qualifications. The flexibility, as Professor Cox notes, follows in 
part from the nature of the enterprise.34 A one-size-fits-all set of 
global standards of necessity emerges as a big tent so that a range 
of national practices can be accommodated. We think that com-
parison also serves to show that there are values at stake—namely, 
conservatism, verifiability, and transparent disclosure of current 
period results. None of these is calculated to appeal to managers, 
nor do they hold out much popular appeal when the stock market 
is booming. But, right now, in the wake of financial collapse, risk 
aversion returns to the fore not only in boardrooms, but also in the 
minds of policymakers. Those pursuing the Roadmap over the next 
33 See Emerging Issues Task Force (“EITF”) Issue 02-3: Issues involved in Account-
ing for Derivative Contracts Held for Trading Purposes and Involved in Energy Trad-
ing and Risk Management Activities (Mar. 20, 2003) (discussing the rescission of 
EITF Issue 98-10: Accounting for Contracts Involved in Energy Trading and Risk 
Management Activities). 
34 See Cox, supra note 9, at 947. 
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few years may have a more difficult trip than its progenitors pro-
ject. 
The globe-spanning flexibility of IFRS also reflects differences in 
corporate governance systems and financial market regulation. 
IFRS’s predecessor systems all developed in small national mar-
ketplaces with tight communities of intermediaries and investor 
populations largely made up of institutions. Tight communities can 
co-exist with “light touch” regulation, and as between GAAP and 
IFRS, the latter is the “light[] touch” choice.35 
But the differences in surrounding regulatory regimes are 
wrought into the systems. As an example, consider the U.K. re-
quirement that, if necessary for the presentation of a true and fair 
view of the business, a particular mandated treatment must be 
overridden.36 IFRS’s stated preference for treatments that follow 
from the economics of the transaction partakes of the same spirit. 
Overrides have not been the practice in the United States, even as 
financials must “fairly present” the company’s financial position. 
Litigation risk is the reason,37 not GAAP. Litigation risk is a prop-
erty of the U.S. adversary regulatory system, a system that, unlike 
that of the United Kingdom, evolved to cope with a dispersed, con-
tinent-wide array of financial institutions and investor clients. 
In addition, most of the countries in the IFRS fold have block-
holder governance systems—the United Kingdom, Australia, and 
Israel being the exceptions. Blockholders, having control or influ-
ence over internal decisionmaking, suffer diminished problems of 
agency and information asymmetry.38 Any question arising under a 
discretionary treatment can be answered by direct inquiry. Ac-
counting principles accordingly matter less than they do given the 
separation of ownership and control that prevails in the United 
States. 
Thus did GAAP develop into the more constraining system as a 
result of political and institutional factors unique to U.S. capital 
35 Donald C. Langevoort, U.S. Securities Law and Global Competition, 13, (George-
town Univ. Law Ctr., Working Paper, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1313133. 
36 See Cunningham, supra note 1, at 41–42. 
37 Id. at 42. 
38 William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance 
and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 Colum. J. 
Transnat’l L. 213, 226 (1999). 
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markets. All of these factors remain pertinent in the present policy 
context, even as potential gains from global convergence introduce 
a complicating factor. Part II offers a more particular description of 
the environment in which FASB and GAAP evolved. 
II. THE POLITICS OF GAAP 
The FASB came into existence thirty-five years ago as the result 
of an ad hoc process looking toward the establishment of a viable 
standard setter under private auspices. The accountants’ profes-
sional organization, the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants (“AICPA”), took the lead,39 with input from organiza-
tions and individuals representing management and the financial 
sector.40 The organizers had a high-powered incentive. They 
wanted a responsive standard setter without ceding territory to a 
federal agency,41 which in those days was associated with domina-
tion by progressive, anti-corporate types.42 
Public legitimacy mattered, so the new standard setter had to be 
independent, public regarding, and insulated from political pres-
sure,43 yet simultaneously responsive to constituent interests.44 The 
result was a board selected by an independent foundation, itself 
populated with constituents, along with a monitoring advisory 
body, also populated with constituents.45 Today the IASB is a car-
39 Ronald King & Gregory Waymire, Accounting Standard-Setting Institutions and 
the Governance of Incomplete Contracts, 9 J. Acct. Auditing & Fin. 579, 583–86 
(1994). 
40 Robert Van Riper, Setting Standards for Financial Reporting: FASB and the 
Struggle for Control of a Critical Process 8–9 (1994); Mohamed Elmuttassim Hussein 
& J. Edward Ketz, Accounting Standards-Setting in the U.S.: An Analysis of Power 
and Social Exchange, 10 J. Acct. & Pub. Pol’y 59, 76 (1991). 
41 The federal securities laws directed the SEC to prescribe the form and content of 
financial statements. See generally, Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 
74 (1934) (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 77, § 77s). For a review of the legislative 
history, see Sean M. O’Connor, Be Careful What You Wish For: How Accountants 
and Congress Created the Problem of Auditor Independence, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 741, 
789–820 (2004). The SEC then turned the matter over to the AICPA. Van Riper, su-
pra note 40, at 7. 
42 See Van Riper, supra note 40, at 9. 
43 Id. 
44 See Robert Chatov, Corporate Financial Reporting: Public or Private Control? 
232–39 (1975). 
45 Van Riper, supra note 40, at 13–18. 
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bon copy, but for a larger cast of characters and geographic distri-
bution requirements.46 
The FASB’s governance model, now replicated at the IASB, 
pursues a middle way that has aroused political objections both on 
the right and on the left. From the right, public choice commenta-
tors have denounced the arrangements surrounding the FASB as a 
rent-seeking scam. From this point of view, the FASB, which 
should have operated as a private standard setter subject to free 
competition, has from the beginning worked instead as a cog in the 
larger machine of the federal disclosure system, the mandates of 
which yield rents to auditing firms.47 Extrapolating, following the 
Roadmap to substitute the IASB only make matters worse, taking 
an unsatisfactory domestic arrangement and embedding it on a 
global basis. 
A second set of critics attacked from the progressive, pluralist 
left. For them, choices of accounting principles have significant al-
locative consequences; therefore, accounting standard setting is a 
high stakes game in which the setter has no alternative but to bal-
ance interests.48 Because the setter resolves political rather than 
technical issues, its legitimacy depends on political responsive-
ness.49 The FASB, at its inception, could not provide this because it 
depended on contributions from the preparers and auditors, groups 
with high stakes in all of its outcomes.50 The critics thus contended 
that the standard setter should be an agency directly responsible to 
Congress.51 Substituting the IASB only makes things worse from 
46 See 2007 Concept Release, supra note 3 ¶ 45,605; Ruder et al., supra note 19, at 
519–20; see also Intern’l Accounting Standards Bd, IASB and the  
IASC Foundation: Who We Are and What We Do, available at 
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/95C54002-7796-4E23A32728D23D2F55EA/0/ 
WhoWeAre_Revise5Feb09.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).  
47 See Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, The Demand for and Supply of Ac-
counting Theories: The Market for Excuses, 54 Acct. Rev. 273, 275–81 (1979). 
48 See Van Riper, supra note 40, at 73–74. 
49 See id. at 22–23. 
50 See id. at 14; Staff of Subcomm. on Reports, Accounting & Mgmt., S. Comm. on 
Gov’t Operations, 94th Cong., Staff Study: The Accounting Establishment 1–2 
(Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter The Accounting Establishment]. 
51 See Van Riper, supra note 40, at 45 (proposing in particular the General Account-
ing Office). The obvious choice, the SEC, delegated the standard-setting function to 
the private sector early in its history. For a critical discussion, see George Mundstock, 
The Trouble with FASB, 28 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 813, 825–26, 839–41 (2003). 
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this point of view as well, because it removes a political subject 
matter to a distant venue in which U.S. domestic concerns occupy 
at best a secondary place on the agenda.52 
The public choice critique has never had much political traction. 
The progressive attack did have an impact in the FASB’s early 
years and prompted process reforms that strengthened the FASB’s 
public bona fides, particularly in a trend toward ever-increasing 
distance from the AICPA.53 It too has lost salience in recent years. 
But the FASB soon enough encountered a third enemy in the form 
of the same corporate managers who had been at the table at its in-
ception. This is the one group of critics that would welcome IFRS. 
The FASB crossed management when it took up its initial pro-
ject to articulate generally accepted goals of accounting. The pro-
ject, eventually called the Conceptual Framework, is a set of prin-
ciples much derided for its high level of generality.54 But the 
Conceptual Framework did lay down at least one outcome deter-
minative point,55 which lies in a single unprepossessing sentence in 
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1: “Financial re-
porting should provide information that is useful to present and 
potential investors and creditors and other users in making rational 
investment, credit, and similar decisions.”56 This is called decision 
usefulness, and it seems to state the obvious. But back in the 1970s 
it was radical stuff.57 
Financial reporting in fact serves two purposes: it imports exter-
nal transparency and also serves as a part of a rational system of in-
ternal management.58 Three decades ago, the prevailing concept of 
purpose, called “stewardship,” encompassed both purposes.59 It 
52 2008 Roadmap, supra note 7, at 70,846–47 (recognizing that substitution of IFRS 
for GAAP implies diminished influence for U.S. interests). 
53 See Van Riper, supra note 40, at 14–15, 46–47, 86–87, 126. 
54 See id. at 80; Stephen A. Zeff, A Perspective on the U.S. Public/Private-Sector 
Approach to the Regulation of Financial Reporting, 9 Acct. Horizons 52, 52, 60 
(1995). 
55 See John C. Burton, A Commentary on the Reflections of Homer Kripke, 4 J. 
Acct. Auditing & Fin. 79, 80 (1989). 
56 See FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1: Objectives of Fi-
nancial Reporting of Business Enterprises ¶ 34 (1978), available at 
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/con1.pdf. 
57 See Van Riper, supra note 40, at 20. 
58 See Watts & Zimmerman, supra note 47, at 296–97. 
59 Id. at 296. 
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meant that corporate managers had a place at the table with mar-
ket actors as important users of the standards. Indeed, they 
claimed primacy.60 
When the FASB elevated the status of outside users of financials 
with decision usefulness,61 it broke with history and defected 
against management. It thereby also succeeded in protecting its 
own independence, avoiding the pluralist alternative of regulation 
as mediation in a world of multiple constituents with varied and 
conflicting preferences.62 Decision usefulness also imported policy 
legitimacy, implying a one-size-fits-all theoretical justification for 
the enterprise as a whole. Back in the 1970s, management was 
peddling national competitiveness and public welfare to argue for a 
cost-benefit burden of proof to be met by every new accounting 
standard63—an argument that later would register in the Congress 
with respect to SEC rulemaking64 and still registers in today’s con-
vergence discussions. The Conceptual Framework’s focus on mar-
kets let the FASB argue back, first, that information is a public 
good that will be underprovided absent regulation,65 and, second, 
that standards directed to user utility reduce the social costs of in-
formation asymmetry, which include high transaction costs and 
thin capital markets with low liquidity.66 
Decision usefulness also aligned the FASB’s goals with that of 
its governmental overseer, the SEC, and the SEC’s goal of investor 
protection.67 The two agencies maintained a cooperative relation-
ship that worked well, at least until recently. The SEC’s recent de-
fection against the FASB also amounts to a defection from deci-
sion usefulness. A shift to IFRS, with its constituency-responsive 
60 See Van Riper, supra note 40, at 21. 
61 See FASB, supra note 56, ¶¶ 27, 32. 
62 See Baruch Lev, Toward a Theory of Equitable and Efficient Accounting Policy, 
63 Acct. Rev. 1, 2, 13 (1988). 
63 See R. K. Mautz & William G. May, Financial Disclosure in a Competitive Econ-
omy: Considerations in Establishing Financial Accounting Standards 1–4 (1978) (pre-
senting a project of the Financial Executives Research Foundation). 
64 See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, § 106(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77b(b) (2006). 
65 See FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2: Qualitative Char-
acteristics of Accounting ¶ 135 (1980), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/con2.pdf; 
Lev, supra note 62, at 8–9. 
66 Lev, supra note 62, at 4–9. 
67 See Van Riper, supra note 40, at 141. 
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stress on balance sheet treatments and de-emphasis of income 
statement responsiveness, would amount to a move back in the di-
rection of stewardship. 
Meanwhile, management has never been happy with GAAP. 
Because the FASB has independently sets its own agenda, man-
agement has seen a classic case of an unresponsive agency promul-
gating regulations for their own sake.68 Management voices use the 
FASB’s notice and comment and advisory processes to object but 
get only occasional concessions as FASB keeps cranking out stan-
dards they would just as soon do without.69 Management also com-
plains of excess complexity, but not when it likes the bottom line 
result.70 The managers call the overall result “standards overload,”71 
and recommend shifting agenda control to a new oversight board 
with power to block agenda items and force revision of existing 
standards.72 
Though management’s agenda reform proposals have never 
gone anywhere, it has scored occasional victories in its long battle 
with the FASB. On occasion, it has used its political muscle to 
block proposed standards. It also secured two seats on the FASB, 
and, for a while, a super majority voting regime that made it harder 
for the FASB to adopt new standards.73 
Management’s complaint of excess complexity collapses into the 
more serious and widespread complaint that the FASB drafts too 
many rules, seeking to supply a clear answer to every possible 
situation, pursuing the objective with detailed statements, bright 
line tests, and multiple exceptions.74 This complaint returns us to 
the SEC Roadmap’s justification for doing away with the FASB al-
together and so bears importantly in the present context. 
68 See Dennis R. Beresford, How Should the FASB Be Judged? 9 Acct. Horizons 56, 
56–57 (1995). 
69 Van Riper, supra note 40, at 98–99, 118–31, 183; Beresford, supra note 68, at 59.  
70 Van Riper, supra note 40, at 110; Beresford, supra note 68, at 60. 
71 See Van Riper, supra note 40, at 137; Beresford, supra note 68, at 60. 
72 Van Riper, supra note 40, at 119–23; Beresford, supra note 68, at 57. 
73 Van Riper, supra note 40, at 126, 150, 154. 
74 See Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Study Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 on the Adoption by the United States Financial Reporting System of a 
Principles-Based Accounting System, § I.C (2003) [hereinafter 2003 SEC Report], 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbasedstand.htm (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2009).  
BRATTON-CUNNINGHAM_BOOK4 5/14/2009 5:49 PM 
1004 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 95:989 
 
There is no question that GAAP’s layers of rules can have per-
verse effects. Internal inconsistency can result.75 Comparability also 
can suffer: reporting entities under the same strict standard can ap-
pear comparable on the faces of their financials when their ar-
rangements in fact are dissimilar.76 Worse, there results a dysfunc-
tional, check-the-box approach to compliance that admits 
transaction structuring and other strategic behavior, along with 
rule compliant statements that do not fairly state the reporting 
company’s results or financial position.77 
Actors at the FASB reply that the rules follow from demands 
generated by managers and auditors looking for treatment and 
scope exceptions and “roadmaps” that hold out “guidance.”78 It 
says it is sorry, but it is just being a responsive regulator and does 
not exercise total control over outcomes.79 But this posture of ac-
commodation also has a dark side, for it is here that the public 
choice critique registers with full force. The securities laws’ re-
quirement of an independent audit makes the large audit firms 
providers of a necessary service, positioning them to collect rents.80 
Complex, rules-based standards aid and abet the rent seeking, gen-
erating work,81 and over time strengthening entry barriers.82 More-
over, innovations get choked off to the extent that they decrease 
auditability and expose the firms to legal risk.83 
All of this is true, but, given the pressures that have come to 
bear on the FASB, it is difficult to imagine a different evolutionary 
course for GAAP. In effect, the FASB has had to take our second-
best world as it finds it. It is a nasty place where incentive problems 
75 Id. § I.G. 
76 Id. 
77 Id.; Katherine Schipper, Principles-Based Accounting Standards, 17 Acct. Hori-
zons 61, 68 (2003). 
78 See Van Riper, supra note 40, at 105. 
79 See Lawrence W. Smith, The FASB’s Efforts Toward Simplification, FASB Rep., 
Feb. 28, 2005, at 2, 3–4.  
80 See George J. Bentson, The Regulation of Accountants and Public Accounting 
Before and After Enron, 52 Emory L.J. 1325, 1329–31 (2003). 
81 See Charles R. Plott & Shyam Sunder, A Synthesis, 19 J. Acct. Res. 227, 231 
(Supp. 1981).  
82 See Dale Buckmaster et al., Measuring Lobbying Influence Using the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board Public Record, 20 J. Econ. & Soc. Measurement 331, 
340 (1994). 
83 See Mundstock, supra note 51, at 817. 
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impair the auditor-client relationship, auditability does matter, and 
the standard setter has to worry about scandal prevention.84 Rules, 
although not ideal, have advantages because they provide a base of 
common assumptions and knowledge for preparers, auditors, and 
users. They decrease differences in measurement; they make non-
compliance more evident. And, as room for differences in judg-
ment narrows, transparency and comparability are enhanced.85 
GAAP, then, has followed from defensible tradeoffs.  
The institutional conditions that led to the tradeoffs will not 
magically disappear upon substitution of IFRS. It is therefore hard 
to predict benefits to domestic statement users from its principles 
and stress on fair presentation. As to management, however, bene-
fits easily can be predicted. 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
So, despite the problems, the FASB put itself on history’s win-
ning side with decision usefulness.86 It thereby aligned itself not 
only with the SEC but also with the broader economic shift away 
from managerialism toward capital market governance under the 
shareholder value norm. The story of GAAP’s evolution is thus a 
story about standard setting in the U.S. markets, where separated 
ownership and control predominate, and tensions between manag-
ers and shareholders are exhaustively worked out in regulation and 
litigation. The FASB opted for conservatism, verifiability, and 
rules because it operates in this environment, not because of some 
refractory, academic commitment to an outmoded approach to 
standard setting. The IASB, with its shorter history and different 
regulatory context, has pursued different values. Accordingly, it is 
not enough to describe it as “independent” and there end the con-
vergence discussion in its favor. Viewed against this background, 
IFRS must look like an improvement to management, perhaps 
even if switching costs in the form of higher audit fees turns out to 
84 See William W. Bratton, Rules, Principles, and the Accounting Crisis in the 
United States, 5 Eur. Bus. Org. L. Rev. 7, 14–18 (2004) (describing advantages of 
rules in the auditing context). 
85 See Schipper, supra note 77, at 68. 
86 For further discussion, see William W. Bratton, Private Standards, Public Gov-
ernance: A New Look at the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 
5 (2007).  
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be onerous. This is not because U.S. management can expect to 
dominate the IASB where it has failed to dominate the FASB. The 
IASB also has earned a reputation for independence.87 Moreover, 
given the IASB’s broader, global roster of constituents, any par-
ticular demands emanating from a single national interest group or 
regulator are bound to resound less forcefully than would occur in 
a domestic standard-setting context. The advantage for manage-
ment lies in the elbow room imported by a shift to a shorter, less 
directive stack of standards. A shift to IFRS thus ameliorates the 
problem of “standards overload” in one swoop. Indeed, given one 
global standard setter and national governments and interest 
groups worldwide, it might prove quite difficult for IASB to crank 
out new standards. 
Why, then, this abrupt concession to management after U.S. ac-
counting’s three-decade-long history of privileging the user inter-
est? The answer is that the prevailing interest group alignment 
changed markedly in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley political economy. 
GAAP has come to be seen as one of the deadweight domestic 
regulatory costs that make U.S. capital markets unattractive to for-
eign firms. Thus has the SEC, looking to lighten its touch, aban-
doned a client that it had long protected. Market intermediaries, 
long quietly aligned with the FASB,88 also appear to have crossed 
over as new listing business has gone to London, Singapore, and 
Hong Kong. Ominously, the audit firms seem to be lining up 
against the FASB as well, angling to get new litigation defenses out 
of the deal89 and perhaps looking forward to collecting switching 
fees. 
87 It famously held its ground against the French banks and their government on fair 
value treatment on macro-hedging. See Ruder et al., supra note 19, at 579–86. More 
recently, however, IASB’s reputation became tarnished when it relented to EU pres-
sure to match U.S. adjustments respecting mark-to-market accounting of distressed 
debt securities in bank portfolios. See, e.g., Phillip Inman, UK Accounting Watchdog 
Threatens to Quit over EU Rule Change, Guardian, Nov. 12, 2008, at 26 (describing 
the resultant threat to resign of Sir David Tweedie, the IASB’s chairman). 
88 See Van Riper, supra note 40, at 98. 
89 See U.S. Dept. of Treasury Advisory Comm. on the Auditing Profession, Final 
Report app. C 3–4 (2008) (appending remarks of U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry 
Paulson connecting globalization and international financial reporting standards with 
legal burdens auditors face); id. at VII.23–VII.32 (reviewing disagreement among 
Committee members on a wide range of litigation defenses and legal protections that 
auditing firms sought in a comprehensive review of issues facing the profession, in-
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We think the SEC is making the classic mistake of a regulator 
facing its first reversal because of jurisdictional competition. The 
earlier domination of U.S. equity markets gave the United States 
the privilege of imposing its own terms on foreign entities.90 The 
United States cannot do that anymore and a question is posed: 
should the United States continue to go its own way or reconstitute 
its markets so as to catch the at-the-margin consumers now listing 
securities elsewhere? In addressing such a question, it is important 
not to panic.91 The past cannot be recaptured, and something must 
be sacrificed. And, competition in global securities market not be-
ing the same thing as competition in a market for widgets; costs 
and benefits do not automatically signal catering to the marginal 
consumer. Protecting domestic markets must be weighed against 
global market share. Therefore, as between the Roadmap and stay-
ing the course with the existing process of letting the FASB and the 
IASB iron out as many differences as the can, we prefer the latter 
course.92 
Finally, opting for IFRS requires defining a framework for rela-
tions between the SEC and the IASB. The United States could fol-
low the EU and reserve a right to endorse new IFRS promulga-
tions, standard by standard, or take a more deferential posture 
toward the IASB.93 The choice presumably will be influenced by a 
yet to be determined pattern of relations between IASB, the Inter-
national Organization of Securities Commissions, and the global 
roster of participating national governments. 
Whichever choice is made, we predict that conflicts will arise. 
Given conflicts and an IASB that proves impervious to U.S. inter-
cluding effects of globalization and movement towards international financial report-
ing standards), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/acap/docs/ 
final-report.pdf.  
90 See generally, Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Market for Securi-
ties Law, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1435 (2008).  
91 Cf. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdic-
tional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 Geo. L.J. 
201, 264–65 (1997) (describing “scare talk” deployments of jurisdictional competition 
theory). 
92 Perhaps the SEC’s ultimate purpose is to give FASB a push to move that process 
along. But if so, this cannot be a good way to apply pressure. To the extent the 
GAAP/IASB convergence process entails bargaining, it makes no sense to pull 
trumps from the national hand. 
93 See Cunningham, supra note 1, at 13, 26–31. 
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ests, whether articulated by management, users, or the SEC, a new 
domestic politics of accounting standard setting will emerge. The 
threshold question will be whether the U.S. national interest coun-
sels departure from IFRS with consequent sacrifice of comparabil-
ity and increase in compliance costs. In light of the contentious his-
tory of GAAP, we predict that the comparability line inevitably 
will be crossed. Once that happens, U.S. IFRS will begin a long, 
painful process of reverting to U.S. GAAP. 
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Topic GAAP IFRS 
 








94 See AICPA, Code of Professional Conduct, Rule 203, available at 
http://www.aicpa.org/about/code/et_203.html; FASB, Proposal: Principles-Based Ap-
proach to U.S. Standard Setting, File Reference No. 1125-001, 7 n.5 (Oct. 21, 2002), 
available at http://www.fasb.org/proposals/principles-based_approach.pdf. 
95 See IASB, International Accounting Standard (“IAS”) 1, Presentation of Finan-
cial Statements, ¶¶ 17–22; Principles-Based Approach, supra note 94, 7 n.5. 
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Allowed97 Prohibited (unusual items 
can be segregated)98 
Restructuring 
costs 
Recognized when  
little discretion to avoid costs 
exists (mostly when  
incurred)99 
Recognized when  
announced or  
commenced100  
 
96 For US GAAP, see generally SEC Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (2008); FASB, 
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (“CON”) 1, Objectives of Financial Re-
porting by Business Enterprises; CON 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting 
Information; CON 3, Elements of Financial Statements of Business Enterprises; CON 
4, Objectives of Financial Reporting by Nonbusiness Organizations; CON 5, Recogni-
tion and Measurement in Financial Statements of Business Enterprises; CON 6, Ele-
ments of Financial Statements; CON 7, Using Cash Flow Information and Present 
Value in Accounting Measurements; FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Stan-
dards (“FAS”) 16, Prior Period Adjustments; FAS 52, Foreign Currency Translation; 
FAS 95, Statement of Cash Flows; FAS 130, Reporting Comprehensive Income; FAS 
141, Business Combinations; FAS 154, Accounting Changes and Error Corrections; 
FASB, Accounting Principles Board Opinion (“APB”) 28, Interim Financial Report-
ing; APB 30, Reporting the Results of Operations–Reporting the Effects of Disposal 
of a Segment of a Business, and Extraordinary, Unusual and Infrequently Occurring 
Events and Transactions; FASB, Accounting Research Bulletin (“ARB”) 43, Re-
statement and Revision of Accounting Research Bulletins; FASB, FASB Interpreta-
tion (“FIN”) 39, Offsetting of Amounts Related to Certain Contracts. For IFRS, see 
generally IAS 1; IAS 7, Cash Flow Statements; IAS 8, Accounting Policies, Changes 
in Accounting Estimates and Errors; IAS 21, The Effects of Changes in Foreign Ex-
change Rates; IAS 29, Financial Reporting in Hyperinflationary Economies; IAS 32, 
Financial Instruments: Presentation. 
97 APB 30, ¶ 1, 10–12. 
98 IAS 8. 
99 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Law and Accounting: Cases and Materials 306–11 
(2005) (excerpting FAS 146, Accounting for Costs Associated with Exit or Disposal 
Activities). 
100 IAS 37, Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets, ¶¶ 14–35. 
IASB is reconsidering its approach to restructuring costs to align the IFRS approach 
more closely with the US GAAP approach. See IASB Press Summary, IAS 37 
Round-table Discussions, available at http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/2C92E25A-
F831-4399-95F2-A6840DCBFA1F/0/IAS37roundtablespresssummary.pdf. As of Feb-
ruary 2009, IASB anticipates adopting a final standard during the first half of 2010. 
See IASB, Liabilities—Amendments to IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and 
Contingent Assets and IAS 19 Employee Benefits ¶ 5 (2009), available at 
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 III. Cash Flow Statements 
 
Interest and  
Dividends  
Interest paid and  
dividends received must be 
classified as operating cash 
flows; dividends paid must be 
classified as financing cash 
flows101 
Choice allowed in classifying: 
1. Dividends and  
interest paid or received as 
operating cash flows, or 
2. Interest or dividends paid 
as financing cash flows and 
interest or dividends received 





101 See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 48–50 (excerpting SEC 
Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3–04 (treatment of dividends) and Accounting Re-
search Bulletin (“ARB”) 43, Ch. 3A, ¶ 4).  
102 IAS 7, ¶¶ 31–34. 
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Generally, amortize over  
service period without  
up-front recognition104  
Allows up-front recognition 






Defer recognition on  
delivered portion if non-
delivery of remainder  
triggers a refund106 
Recognize on delivery of  
portion even if non-delivery 
of remainder triggers a  






Allows percentage of  
completion method to be  
approached using either 





Requires completed contract 
method in certain  
circumstances108  
Requires revenue-cost  
approach to percentage of 
completion method (unless 
percentage not reliably  
estimable, in which case  
requires cost recovery  
method) 
 
Prohibits completed contract 
method109 
 
103 For US GAAP, see generally CON 5; SEC, Staff Accounting Bulletin (“SAB”) 
104, Revenue Recognition; AICPA, Statement of Position (“SOP”) 81-1, Accounting 
for Performance of Construction-Type and Certain Production-Type Contracts; SOP 
97-2, Software Revenue Recognition; FASB, Emerging Issues Task Force Abstract 
(“EITF”) 99-17, Accounting for Advertising Barter Transactions; EITF 00-21, Reve-
nue Arrangements with Multiple Deliverables; FASB, Technical Bulletin (“FTB”) 90-
1, Accounting for Separately Priced Extended Warranty and Product Maintenance 
Contracts. For IFRS, see generally IAS 11, Construction Contracts; IAS 18, Revenue; 
IFRS, International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee Interpretation 
(“IFRIC”) 13, Customer Loyalty Programmes.  
104 See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 118–22 (excerpting 
SEC, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1454, In re Gunther Inter-
national, Ltd. (Sept. 25, 2001) and FAS 45, Accounting for Franchise Fee Revenue). 
105 IAS 18. 
106 See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 100–01 (excerpting SAB 
101, Revenue Recognition in Financial Statements and CON 5 ¶¶ 83(b), 84(a) & 
84(d)). 
107 IAS 18, ¶¶ 14–19. 
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Not included when initially 
measuring hedged item111 
Are included when  
initially measuring hedged 





Can be assumed in some 
cases113 
Must be demonstrable in all 
cases114 
Macro-hedging  Prohibited115 Permitted116 
Reclassifications 
of investments 
in to the  
“trading” class 
Required in some cases (but 
reclassification from trading  
prohibited)117 
Prohibited (both to or from 
trading)118 
 
108 Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 122–28 (excerpting ARB 45, 
Long-Term Construction-Type Contracts and SEC, In re Touche Ross & Co. (Nov. 
14, 1983)). 
109 IAS 18, ¶¶ 26–28. 
110 For US GAAP, see generally FAS 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments 
and Hedging Activities; FAS 137, Deferral of the Effective Date of FASB Statement 
No. 133; FAS 138, Accounting for Certain Derivative Instruments and Certain Hedg-
ing Activities; FAS 149, Amendment of Statement 133 on Derivative Instruments and 
Hedging Activities; FAS 155, Accounting for Certain Hybrid Financial Instruments; 
EITF D-102, Documentation of the Method Used to Measure Hedge Ineffectiveness 
under FASB Statement No. 133. For IFRS, see generally IAS 39, Financial Instru-
ments: Recognition and Measurement; IFRS, International Financial Reporting Stan-
dard (“IFRS”) 7, Financial Instruments: Disclosures; IFRIC 9, Reassessment of Em-
bedded Derivatives.  
111 FAS 133, ¶¶ 29–35; FAS 138, ¶¶ 1–4. 
112 IAS 39, ¶¶ 78, 86, 95, 97; see also Deloitte, Summaries of IFRSs, IAS 39, 
http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ias39.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2009). 
113 See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 357–60 (excerpting FAS 
133). 
114 IAS 39, ¶¶ 71–102 (especially ¶ 81).  
115 FAS 133, ¶¶ 357, 443, 447, 449. 
116 IAS 39, ¶¶ 71–102; see also Deloitte, IAS 39, supra note 112.  
117 See FAS 159, The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Financial Liabili-
ties, ¶ 29; see also id. at A51–52 (noting that continuing differences in accounting for 
financial instruments between GAAP and IFRS exist, “principally [as] to disclosures, 
scope exceptions, and whether certain eligibility criteria must be met to elect the fair 
value option”). 
118 IAS 39, ¶¶ 50–54. 
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 VI. Inventory 
 
Methods  Allows LIFO or FIFO (and 
others)119 
Prohibits LIFO120 
Measurement Lower of cost or  
market121 
Lower of cost or net  
realizable value (“NRV”)122 
Adjustments  Lower of cost or market ad-
justments cannot be  
reversed123 
Lower of cost or NRV must 
be reversed in some cases124  
 
 
119 See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 187–88 (excerpting 
ARB 43, Ch. 4, Stmts. 4 & 8), 190–91 (excerpting In re Arthur Andersen & Co. 
(FIFO)), 194–97 (excerpting United States v. Ingredient Technology Corp. (LIFO)). 
120 IAS 2, Inventories, ¶ 25. 
121 See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 205–06 (excerpting 
ARB 43, Ch. 4, Stmts. 5–6). 
122 IAS 2, ¶ 9. 
123 See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 205–06 (excerpting 
ARB 43, Ch. 4, Stmts. 5–6); see also SEC, Codification of Staff Accounting Bulletins, 
Topic 5: Miscellaneous Accounting Topics, Section BB. Inventory Valuation Allow-
ances, http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sabcodet5.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). 
124 IAS 2, ¶ 33. 
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 VII. Tangible Long-Lived Assets125 
 




Impairment suggested when 
book value exceeds gross  
expected future cash flows; 
second step measures 
amount of impairment using  
discounted cash flow  
analysis128  
Impairment suggested when 
book value exceeds greater of 
value in use (discounted cash 




Recognized in current  
income130 
If cost method used,  
impairments recognized in 
income; if revaluation used, 
impairment usually treated as  
balance sheet adjustment131  
Impairment 
Reversals 
Impairments, once  
recognized, cannot be  
reversed 132  
Recognized impairments  
reversed in certain cases133 
Investment 
Property  
Required to be at  
depreciated cost134 
Allowed at depreciated cost 
or fair value135  
 
125 For US GAAP, see generally FAS 34, Capitalization of Interest Cost; FAS 143, 
Accounting for Asset Retirement Obligations; FAS 144, Accounting for the Impair-
ment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets; FAS 154; ARB 43, Restatement and Revi-
sion of Accounting Research Bulletins; APB 6, Status of Accounting Research Bulle-
tins; FIN 47, Accounting for Conditional Asset Retirement Obligations. For IFRS see 
generally IAS 16, Property, Plant and Equipment; IAS 23, Borrowing Costs; IAS 36, 
Impairment of Assets.  
126 See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 148–50 (excerpting 
CON 5 ¶ 67a and In re Harlan & Boettger, LLP). 
127 IAS 16, ¶¶ 29–31; IAS 36, ¶¶ 18–57. 
128 See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 165–67 (excerpting 
SFAS 144, ¶¶ 7, 23). 
129 IAS 36, ¶ 6 (providing relevant definitions) and ¶¶ 7–17 (discussing test). 
130 See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 167 (excerpting SFAS 
144, ¶ 25). 
131 IAS 36, ¶¶ 58–64. 
132 See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 165–68 (excerpting FAS 
142, Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets, ¶ 15 and FAS 144); FAS 144 ¶ B53. 
133 See IAS 36, ¶¶ 110–124 (addressing reversal of impairment); see also Deloitte, 
Summaries of IFRSs, IAS 36, http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ias36.htm (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2009). 
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Costs of Major  
Overhauls 
Generally expensed136  Capitalized137  
 
 
134 See Ernst & Young, US GAAP vs. IFRS, at 15 (2009), available at 
http://www.ey.com/Global/assets.nsf/International/IFRS_v_GAAP_basics_Jan09/$file
/IFRS_v_GAAP_basics_Jan09.pdf (stating that investment property is not a sepa-
rately defined classification in US GAAP). 
135 IAS 40, Investment Property, ¶ 30; see also Deloitte, Summaries of IFRSs, IAS 
40, http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ias40.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). Initial mea-
surement is at cost. See IAS 40, ¶¶ 20, 23; IASC Foundation, Technical Summary, 
IAS 40, available at http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/0E7AB953-8BE4-4799-97BC-
A3BDE0B01A3E/0/IAS40.pdf. 
136 See FASB, Board Meeting Handout: Planned Major Maintenance Activities 3 
(Mar. 8, 2006) (noting intent to issue an FSP to require direct expensing of all mainte-
nance activities), available at http://72.3.243.42/board_handouts/03-08-06.pdf. 
137 IAS 16, ¶ 13. 
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Expensed as incurred;  
included in operating cash 
flows138 
Research costs expensed as 
incurred; development costs 
capitalized and amortized; 
portion capitalized  




Present value of  
expected disposal  
proceeds140  
Current net selling price,  
assuming asset is in expected  





Fair value142 Higher of use value or fair 




Special test compares fair 
value of cash  
generating unit to book 
value, then compares good-
will to carrying value144 
No special test (use one simi-
lar to other long-lived assets, 
a single-step  computation)145  
Impairment 
Reversals 
Prohibited 146 Permitted in some cases147 
Revaluations Prohibited 148 Permitted in some cases149 
 
138 See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 144–45 (excerpting FAS 
No. 142 ¶ 10). 
139 IAS 38, Intangible Assets, ¶¶ 51–71; see also IASC Foundation, Technical Sum-
mary, IAS 38, http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/149D67E2-6769-4E8F-976D-
6BABEB783D90/0/IAS38.pdf. 
140 FAS 142, ¶ 13. 
141 IAS 38, ¶¶ 100–03; see also IASC Foundation, supra note 139. 
142 FAS 144, ¶ 7; see also id. ¶ 5 (noting that the standard does not apply to a variety 
of accounting measurements, such as goodwill or certain other intangible assets). 
143 IAS 36, ¶ 18. 
144 FAS 142, ¶¶ 18–22. 
145 IAS 36, ¶¶ 80–99; see also IASC Foundation, Technical Summary, IAS 36, 
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/A288C781-7D39-4988-BA71-9AB77A263BA0/0/ 
IAS36.pdf. 
146 See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 165–68 (excerpting FAS 
142, ¶ 15 and FAS 144); FAS 144, ¶ B53; see also supra note 128. 
147 IAS 36, ¶¶ 109–25. 
148 See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 168 (excerpting FAS 
142 ¶ 17). 
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Not usually recomputed after 
initial computation150 
Recomputed at each balance 
sheet date151  
 
149 IAS 38, ¶¶ 75–87. 
150 See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 180–81 (excerpting FAS 
143 ¶¶ 3–11). 
151 IAS 37, ¶ 59. 
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IX. Long-Term Investments 
 
Classification  Only securities are classified 
as trading, available-for-sale, 
or held-to-maturity152 
All financial investments,  
including securities, are  









Cost Cost or fair value if reliable 
measure available154  
De-recognition Based on surrendering  
control; diminishes reliance 




Based on risks-and-rewards 







Must be accounted for by cost 
(and depreciation) method157  
Can be accounted for by cost 
(and depreciation) method, 
or by fair value method with 
changes reported in income158 
 
152 FAS 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, ¶ 4. 
153 IAS 39, ¶ 2. 
154 Id. ¶¶ 43–70 (especially ¶ 46).  
155 FAS 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extin-
guishments of Liabilities, ¶¶ 125–140. 
156 IAS 39, ¶¶ 14–42. 
157 APB 6, ¶ 17. 
158 IAS 40, ¶ 30. 
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Based on majority  
ownership 
 
Closing date generally used 
for recognizing acquisitions159 
Based on control 
 
 
Control date used for  
recognizing acquisitions160 
Consolidation  Required as to majority 
owned subsidiaries unless 
parent does not exercise  
control161 
 
Required as to  controlled  
entities unless except for  
interests in acquired  
subsidiaries classifiable as 











Recognize only for existing 
activities begun before  
acquisition, to be completed 
in one year165  
Recognize only for provisions 




Can be recognized if post-
acquisition restructuring of 
acquired entity planned 
Generally not allowed, 
unless acquired entity had 
recorded contingent  
liability before transaction  
 
 
159 See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 267–72 (excerpting FAS 
94, Consolidation of All Majority-Owned Subsidiaries and ARB 51, Consolidated Fi-
nancial Statements); FAS 141, ¶¶ 10–11. 
160 IAS 27, Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements, ¶¶ 1, 4, 21. 
161 See Cunningham, Law and Accounting, supra note 99, at 267–92 (excerpting FAS 
94; ARB 51, Consolidated Financial Statements; FAS 141). 
162 IAS 27. A prior standard stated an exception in terms of temporary control. See 
Deloitte, IAS 39, supra note 112.  
163 FAS 141, ¶¶ 60–66 (discussing subsequent accounting practices); see Deloitte, 
IFRSs and US GAAP: A Pocket Comparison 31 (2008) (noting as to different ac-
counting policies of parents and subsidiaries that IFRS requires them to be con-
formed whereas US GAAP has no specific requirements).  
164 IAS 27, ¶¶ 28–29. 
165 FAS 141, ¶¶ 51–56. 
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Not recognized166  Can sometimes be  








Classified as a liability168  Classified as both a liability 




Classifiable as long-term if 
waiver of default obtained  
before financial statements are 
issued 
Classifiable as long-term if 
waiver of default obtained  
before balance sheet date  
 
 
166 FAS 5, Accounting for Contingencies, ¶ 17. 
167 These narrow circumstances include recognition of gains in connection with un-
certain tax positions and by interpretation and application of provisions dealing with 
contingent assets and contingent liabilities. See IAS 37. 
168 APB 14, Accounting for Convertible Debt and Debt Issued with Stock Purchase 
Warrants, ¶ 12. 
169 IAS 32, ¶¶ 28–32. 
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Based on presence of any one 
of four defined criteria171  





Excluded from minimum 
lease payments analysis of 
capital lease classification  
decision173  
Included in minimum lease 
payments analysis of capital 
lease classification decision  
Output  
Contracts 
Classified as leases Not classified as leases 
 
170 GAAP uses the term capital leases; IFRS uses the term finance leases.  
171 FAS 13, Accounting for Leases, ¶¶ 6–7. 
172 IAS 17, Leases, ¶¶ 7–8. 
173 FAS 13, ¶¶ 20–22. 
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Amortized over service  





At least the unfunded  
accumulated pension benefit 
obligation appears in the  
balance sheet as a minimum  
liability176  
No minimum liability  




No limitation on recognition 
of pension assets178  
Some limitation on  
recognition of pension  
assets179  
Legal Changes May not be anticipated in 
variables used in making  
calculation  
Should be anticipated in  




Expensed when employees 
accept and amount can be  
estimated; recognize  
contractual benefits when it is 
probable that employees will 
accept180 
Expensed when employer is 




174 FAS 87, Employers’ Accounting for Pensions, ¶¶ 162–67. 
175 IAS 19, Employee Benefits, ¶ 10. 
176 FAS 87, ¶¶ 144–56. 
177 IAS 19, ¶¶ 49–60. 
178 FAS 87 ¶¶ 117–23. 
179 IAS 19, ¶¶ 102–04. 
180 FAS 88, Employers’ Accounting for Settlements and Curtailments of Defined 
Benefit Pension Plans and for Termination Benefits, ¶ 15. 
181 IAS 19, ¶ 133. 
